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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

/

Plaintiff/Respondent,

/

vs.

/

STEVEN MAX ELLIOTT,

/

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 981616-CA

/

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
This appeal is from a final Order and Judgment finding the
Appellant guilty of absconding, a Third Degree Felony, in violation
of Section 76-8-309.5 U.C.A.

(1953), as amended, in so far as

Appellant was found to be an offender who absconded supervision by
willfully changing his residence that he reported as his correct
address

without

permission.

notifying

his

parole

officer

or

obtaining

Appellant was found guilty of said offense following

a jury trial.

Please refer to the attached Verdict dated July 28,

1998 (R. at 062)

Appellant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison

on August 26, 1998 for a term of imprisonment of an indeterminate
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term of not to exceed five years in prison.
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Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section
78-2a~36(e).
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

/

Plaintiff/Respondent,

/

vs .

/

Case No. 981616-CA

STEVEN MAX ELLIOTT

/

Priority 2

Defendant/Appellant.

/

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is from a final Order and Judgment finding the
Appellant guilty of absconding, a Third Degree Felony, in violation
of Section 76-8-309.5 U.C.A.

(1953), as amended, in so far as

Appellant was found to be an offender who absconded supervision by
willfully changing his residence that he reported as his correct
address

without

permission.
a jury trial.

notifying

his

parole

officer

or

obtaining

Appellant was found guilty of said offense following
Please refer to the attached Verdict dated July 28,

1998.

(R. at 062)

Prison

on August

Appellant was sentenced to the Utah State

26, 1998

for a
1

term

of

imprisonment

of

an

indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in prison.
P.

064)

This

Court

has

jurisdiction

pursuant

to

(R. at

Utah

Code

Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(d)
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
POINT
Did the trial Court commit reversible error
when it failed to dismiss the charge of
absconding, when the State failed to establish
a primae facie case against the Appellant?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to send a
case to the jury, the Court uses the same standard as for a claim
of insufficient evidence to support a jury verdict.
Dibello, 780 P. 2d 1221

(Utah 1989)

State v.

In considering a claim for

sufficiency of the evidence, the Utah Court of

Appeals reviews

evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it
in a light most favorable to the verdict, and reverses convictions
for insufficient evidence only when the evidence so viewed, is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the Defendant
committed the crime of which he was convicted.

State v. Johnson,

821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1992)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellant was charged with absconding, a Third Degree
Felony

in violation

amended, as follows:

of

Section

76-8-309.5, U.C.A.

Said Defendant,

(1953),

as

"an offender", absconded

supervision by willfully changing his residence that he reported as
his

correct

address

without

notifying
2

his

parole

officer

or

obtaining permission.

Please refer to the attached Information,

(R. at 001), marked Appellant's Addendum #1.
convicted by a jury.

Appellant was

Please refer to the Jury Verdict (R. at P.

062), attached hereto as Appellant's Addendum #2.

Subsequently on

August 26, 1998, Appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate term
at the Utah State Prison of not to exceed five years. Please refer
to

the

attached

Judgment

&

Conviction,

attached

hereto

as

Appellant's Addendum #3.
At the close of the State's case, Appellant, through his
public defender, moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that
the State

failed

to prove, beyond a reasonable

doubt, that

Appellant had changed his residence that he reported to his parole
officer

without

notifying

his

permission.

(R. at 081, P. 135)

the defense

rested without

defense.

parole

officer

or

obtaining

The Court denied the Motion and

calling witnesses or providing a

(R. at 081, P. 136 & 137)

Please refer to that portion

of the transcript of the record, attached as Addendum #4.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant was released from the Utah State Prison and placed
on parole on or about August 6, 1997.

(R. at 081, P. 106 & 154)

On or about May 20, 1998, Appellant was charged with absconding, a
Third Degree Felony, in violation of Section 76-8-309.5, U.C.A.
(1953), as amended as follows:
Said Defendant, "an offender", absconded
supervision
by
willfully
changing
his
residence that he reported as his correct
address without notifying his parole officer
or obtaining permission. (R. at P. 001)
3

The matter went to trial on the above information on July 28,
1998 before the Honorable W. Brent West of the Second Judicial
District Court of Weber County, State of Utah.
Appellant and Robbie Rhoades were both on parole from the Utah
State

Prison,

and

Appellant

Ercanbrack, his parole agent.

was

being

supervised

(R. at 081, P. 82 & 83)

by

Glen

Both men

had been, friends for some years and both worked for Alex Hurtado in
their

capacities

as

construction

workers, both

interior

and

exterior, remodeling homes in January of 1998. Both men worked on
a project located at 1462 Washington Boulevard.

Mr. Rhoades was

paid wages, while Appellant was authorized to reside in one of the
apartments at that address in exchange for his work for Mr.
Hurtado.

(R. at 081, P. 82 & 83)

During this period, Mr. Rhoades

was living at a halfway house known as NUCCC, Ogden, Utah.

(R. at

081, P. 84)
On or about

January

9,

1998, Mr. Ercanbrack

and other

colleagues conducted a supervision review with Appellant as a
result of dirty urine and discussed Appellant's parole requirements
with him. Appellant was told at that time that he needed to return
to the parole office on January 13, 1998 so that Mr. Ercanbrack
could contact the parole office and make a decision of whether or
not to revoke Appellant's parole as a result of Appellant's
position that he did not pass drug treatment.

(R. at 081, P. ill)

Appellant had produced a urine sample that tested positive for the
use of cocaine.

(R. at 081, P. Ill) Appellant subsequently failed

to report for his January 13, 1998 appointment with his parole
4

officer.

(R. at 081, P. 112). Mr. Ercanbrack went to Appellant's

home at 1462 Washington Boulevard, but did not find Appellant or
his

truck

at

that

location.

This visit

Appellant's 7:00 p.m. curfew.

was

conducted

after

(R. at 081, P. 112)

On January 15, 1998, Mr. Ercanbrack received a phone call from
Appellant.
Ercanbrack

Appellant was told to stay home, but by the time
arrived

at

Appellant's

apartment,

he

was

gone.

Ercanbrack then contacted Appellant's friend, Robbie Rhoades, at
the half way house in order to get Rhoades to tell him Appellant's
location.

(R. at 081, P. 115)

Ercanbrack

testified that he

threatened to send Rhoades back to prison if he did not cooperate.
(R. at 081. P. 128)

Ercanbrack also testified that Rhoades told

him that Appellant said he was leaving, was not coming back and to
pack up the rest of his things.

(R. at 081, P. 116)

Soon thereafter, Ercanbrack and a colleague had the apartment
owner,

Alex

Hurtado,

let

them

into

Appellant's

apartment.

Ercanbrack testified that he observed property missing, with only
"just scattered debris in the apartment."

(R. at 081, P. 116) Mr.

Hurtado had no knowledge of the Appellant's whereabouts, but had
not removed Appellant's remaining property and had not re-rented
the apartment to anyone else. Among personal property remaining in
the apartment, Ercanbrack admitted during cross-examination that
items of clothing were present, along with a couch, a bed, end
tables,

lamps,

weight

belonging to Appellant.
refrigerator

for

bench,

dishes,

plates

and

other

items

Ercanbrack did not bother looking in the

evidence

of

Appellant's
5

residence

in

the

apartment.
portion

(R. at 081, P. 134)

of

examination,

Ercanbrack's
incorporated

Please see the attached copy of a

testimony
herein

during

by

Appellant's

reference

as

cross-

Appellant's

Addendum #5.
Following Ercanbrack's testimony, the State rested its case
and defense counsel moved for a directed verdict.

This Motion was

denied, the case was sent to the jury and subsequently Appellant
was found guilty of absconding and sentenced to prison.
ARGUMENT
POINT
Did the trial Court commit reversible error
when it failed to dismiss the charge of
absconding, when the State failed to establish
a primae facie case against the Appellant?
The State did not prove that Appellant absconded supervision
by willfully changing his residence without notifying his parole
officer or obtaining permission to change said residence.

The

Court abused its discretion by denying Appellant's Motion for a
Directed Verdict based upon this lack of evidence, even though the
State failed to present a primae facie case.
In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to send a
case to the jury, the Court must use the same standard of review as
a claim of insufficient evidence to support a jury verdict.
v.

Dibello,

780

P. 2d

1221

(Utah

1989)

A

challenge

State
to

the

sufficiency of the evidence presents the Defendant with a heavy
burden.

He must first marshall all the evidence supporting the

jury's verdict and then demonstrate how this evidence was viewed in
the

most

favorable

light

and

is
6

insufficient

to

support

the

verdict.

State v. Pillinv, 875 P.2d 604 (Utah App. 1994); State v.

Sjcheel, 823 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d
1201 (Utah App. 1991)
In the case at bar, very little direct evidence was presented
to the jury nor was any direct evidence available to suggest that
the Appellant had willfully changed his residence from that given
to the parole officer.

Appellant's parole officer, Ercanbrack,

testified that after he became aware of Appellant's dirty urine, he
instructed the Appellant to report back a few days later.
081 P. Ill)
Appellant

(R. at

There is nothing in the transcript to indicate that

was

told he was going back

to prison for a parole

violation, nor is there anything in the record to suggest that
Appellant was not living or would not be living at his reported
address during the interim.

Just because Ercanbrack could not find

Appellant between January 13th and January 15, 1998, does not mean
that Appellant had changed his address.

To be sure, Ercanbrack

testified that when he gained entrance to Appellant's apartment on
January 15, 1998, all of Appellant's property remained
apartment, with the exception of a TV and a guitar.

in the

In fact,

Appellant contacted Ercanbrack on the 15th of January to tell him
he was going into drug treatment.
alternative
treatment.
produced

at

residence,

except

There was no mention of any

for

(R. at 081, P. 118 & 119)
trial

that

Appellant

residence was the fact that

the

possibility

of

drug

In fact, the only evidence
had

willfully

changed

his

Ercanbrack could not locate Appellant

personally and the testimony of an inmate from the Utah State
7

Prison that Appellant was going to leave and wanted him (Rhoades)
to box up his things.

In fact, even the landlord of Appellant's

apartment had failed to box Appellant's property or to re-rent the
apartment. There was no evidence of how long Appellant had leased
the premises, whether he had paid for the rental for future weeks
or whether he was delinquent in his rent. The trial Court allowed
this case to go to the jury speculating on whether Appellant had
made other arrangements for living, whether he had returned to the
apartment for the rest of his property, whether he was living with
someone else or even whether he had been hospitalized. As it turns
out, Appellant was arrested in a park in Salt Lake City in March of
1998. (R. at 081, P. 120)
The facts presented by the State simply cannot support the
jury verdict.

In fact, there is no evidence in the record that

Appellant intended to change his residence.

He was not charged

with failure to report to his parole officer, or even for a parole
violation incident to the dirty urine.

The State failed to prove

that the Appellant acted with the requisite mental state acts
required for a successful prosecution for the crime with which
Appellant was charged.
CONCLUSION
Appellant's conviction should be set aside and vacated and
Appellant should be released from custody.
DATED this

/

day of February, 1999.

&ANDINE SALERNO,
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MftHiiNG
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing Brief of Appellant was posted in the United States mail,
postage prepaid on this

/

day of February, 1999 and addressed

tO:

Jan Graham
Attorney General
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
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ADDENDUM # 1

SECOND JUDICIAL ^xSTRICT COURT OF WEBER COIL.-f, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs .
STEVEN ELLIOT

INFORMATION
Attorney No

98-1092F

Defendant
O.T.N.

DOB -- 62/05/13
State of Utah
County of Weber

ss

Count
The undersigned complainant upon oath states that the
complainant has reason to believe that the above named defendant between
January 13, 1998 and March 17, 1998 in Weber County, State of Utah
committed a
THIRD DEGREE FELONY, TO WIT:
ABSCONDING, 76-8-309.5, U.C.A. (1953), AS AMENDED AS FOLLOWS:
SAID DEFENDANT,
"AN OFFENDER", DID ADOeUMJ J?'kUlW~A FACILITY BY ~
!
L5-AVINC
AT--A—
: MI33ieU g--P£RMXS-SJLQii--AN^^
-9RES-eR ^BEiy~TTME-r-^h
ABSCONDED SUPERVISION BY WILLFULLY CHANGING
HIS/HBR RESIDENCE THAT HE/fiSS REPORTED AS HIS/HSR CORRECT ADDRESS
WITHOUT NOTIFYING HIS/HgR PAROLE OFFICER OR OBTAINING PERMISSION.

This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses
AGENT G. ERCANBRACK
R. ROSE
Authorized for presentment and filing:
MARK R. DeCARIA,
County Attorney _____
/
y< ' i >: .['A
\ . . ,--i \An k •/ ,/
J BRENDA J . BEATON, /NU ... -6^3 A
Subscribed in my presence this 20th day of May
, 1998
BV-./

4VLAG1STRATE
Presented and filed this 20th day of May V>
, 1998

001

ADDENDUM # 2

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

VERDICT

Plaintiff,
vs.
CASE NO: 981902358
STEVEN ELLIOT,
Defendant,

We, the jury impaneled to try the issues in the above-entitled matter, do hereby find
the defendant, GUILTY ofAbsconding a third degree felony.
DATED this 2SZay of July, 1998.

062

^

ADDENDUM # 3

SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

.£ : ;- ?
**.*J <* C

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 981902358 FS

STEVEN ELLIOT,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

W. BRENT WEST
August 26, 1998

PRESENT
Clerk:
pama
Prosecutor: LES DAROCZI
Defendant
Defendants Attorney(s) : PDA, SNIDER
Agency: Adult Probation and Par
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: May 13, 1962
Video
Tape Number:
W82 6
Tape Count: 12:25
CHARGES
1. ABSCONDING - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 08/26/1998 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of ABSCONDING a 3rd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not
to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.

Page 1

064

Case No: 981902358
Date:
Aug 26, 1998

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
The defendant to serve 0-5 years at the Utah State Prison. Time to
run consecutive with other charges. Defendant granted credit for
time served.

_

-pi

Dated this 2b

day of

nU&ASl

District Court Judge

Page 2 (last)

065

ADDENDUM # 4

Miilti-Pagc
Page 137
particularly if he were going on the lam or if he
were going to run.

In fact, the less items you take

the much easier it is to run away.
Contrary to that, there is the evidence that
a lot of his stuff remained, he seemed to take the
thing most valuable to his mother's, and I can't
remember what the second item was, there was a guitar
and a t.v., but I don't have any evidence at this
point other than inferentially through a question
that you asked, what happened to the t.v.,

so at this

point it's a factual issue at least sufficient to
survive a motion for directed verdict or a motion to
dismiss and requiring the defense to go forward if
they intend to put on any evidence.
MR. DAROCIZ:
THE COURT:

Thank you.
So we'll take a short -- we've

got another four minutes left, and then we'll come
back and hear from the defense.
MR. SNIDER:

Thank you.

(WHEREAS, THIS HEARING WENT OFF THE RECORD).
THE COURT:

You can be seated.

bringing the jury back in.

All right.

They're
The record

will reflect that both the State and the Defense are
here, Mr. Elliot is here and the jury is back in the
box. At this point, Mr. Snider, is the defense
DEPOMAX REPORTING, LLC (801) 328-1188

Multi-Page
Page 136
failed to meet their burden of proof in this case and
put on any elements sufficient to show that Mr.
Elliot absconded.
The evidence is that he wasn't there when
they showed up, the evidence is that he was in Salt
Lake, but there's no evidence that said that he had
never moved from thac residence.

They said we didn't

find him there when we went by, but there's no
evidence that said he r.cved from that residence.
THE COURT:
MR. DAROCIZ:
THE COURT:
this point.

2kay.

Mr. Darociz?

Oh, I submit it, Your Honor.
Z'~

going to deny the motion at

There is sufficient evidence if this

jury were to choose :: believe certain portions of
the testimony, they cculd make a finding that he was
an offender, that he absconded supervision by
willfully changing his resident that he reported as
his correct address without notifying his Parole
Officer and obtaining permission.
I guess not creating any cases that aren't
there, if they choose :c believe the testimony that
he told his colleague chat he worked with that he was
upset about this dircy urine and that he was leaving,
it's also inferentially correct that he doesn't
25 I necessarily have to cake everything with him,

DEPOMAX REPORTING, LLC (801) 328-1188

ADDENDUM # 5

Multi-Page
Page 134
other page of questions.
THE COURT:
Q

Okay.

(By MR. SNIDER)

Regard -- You went over

to Mr. Elliot's apartment on the 15th; correct?
A

Yes.

I did.

Q

And you said some items were missing.

Now, Mr. Darociz in his opening statement said, and I
wrote it down so I can make sure, "most of his things
are gone."

Now, that would be somewhat of a

misstatement; correct?

There was still a couch

there; correct?
A

There was still a couch.

Yes.

Q

A bed was there?

A

Yes .

Q

Still had clothes in the closet?

A

A few.

Q

Still had food in the refrigerator?

A

Well, we never looked in the fridge.

Q

End tables, lamps, weight bench, dishes,

Not as many as the other time.

plates, stuff like that, they were all still there?
A

Yeah.
MR. SNIDER:

Okay.

No other questions.

Thank you.
THE COURT:
MR. DAROCIZ:

Mr. Darociz?
Nothing further, Your Honor.

DEPOMAX REPORTING, LLC (801) 328-1188

ADDENDUM # 6

321

CRIMINAL CODE

pants in an official meeting tending to interrupt its
proceedings.
(2) "Official meeting," as used in this section, means any
lawful meeting of public servants for the purposes of carrying
on governmental functions.
1992
76-8-305. I n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h a r r e s t i n g officer.
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has
knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have
knowledge, t h a t a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful
arrest or detention of t h a t person or another and interferes
with the arrest or detention by:
(1) use of force or any weapon;
(2) t h e arrested person's refusal to perform any act
required by lawful order:
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or
detention; or
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to
refrain from performing any act that would impede the
arrest or detention.
1990
76-8-306. O b s t r u c t i n g j u s t i c e .
(1) A person is guilty of an offense if, with intent to hinder,
prevent, or delay the discovery, apprehension, prosecution,
conviction, or punishment of another for the commission of a
crime, he:
(a) knowing an offense has been committed, conceals it
from a magistrate;
(b) harbors or conceals the offender;
(c) provides the offender a weapon, transportation,
disguise, or other means for avoiding discovery or apprehension;
(d) warns the offender of impending discovery or apprehension;
(e) conceals, destroys, or alters any physical evidence
that might aid in the discovery, apprehension, or conviction of the person;
(f) obstructs by force, intimidation, or deception anyone from performing an act t h a t might aid in the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, or conviction of the person; or
(g) having knowledge t h a t a law enforcement officer
has been authorized or has applied for authorization
under either Section 77-23a-10 or 77-23a-15 to intercept a
wire, electronic, or oral communication, gives notice or
attempts to give notice of the possible interception to any
person.
(2) An offense under Subsections (l)(a) through (f) is a class
B misdemeanor, unless the actor knows t h a t the offender
committed a capital offense or a felony of the first degree, in
w
hich case the offense is a second degree felony.
(3) An offense under Subsection {Dig) is a third degree
felony.
(4) Subsection (l)(f) does not apply to an act against a juror.
Obstructing the function of a juror is addressed in Section
(5) The provisions of Section 76-8-316 shall govern an act or
"U-eat against a judge or a member of the Board of Pardons
^ d Parole or the judge's or member's immediate family. 1995
7

&8«307. F a i l u r e to aid p e a c e officer.
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if, upon
°inmand by a peace officer identifiable or identified by him as
?U(:h, he unreasonably fails or refuses to aid the peace officer
121
effecting an arrest or in preventing the commission of any
°Sense by another person.
1973
c

7

&8-308.

A c c e p t a n c e of b r i b e or bribery to p r e v e n t
criminal prosecution — Defense.
(i) A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if he:

76-8-309.5

(a) solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit as
consideration for his refraining from initiating or aiding
in a criminal prosecution; or
(b) confers, offers, or agrees to confer any benefit upon
another as consideration for the person refraining from
initiating or aiding in a criminal prosecution.
(2) It is an affirmative defense t h a t the value of the benefit
did not exceed an amount which the actor believed to be due as
restitution or indemnification for the loss caused or to be
caused by the offense.
1991
76-8-309.

E s c a p e a n d a g g r a v a t e d e s c a p e — Consecutive s e n t e n c e s — Definitions.
(1) A prisoner is guilty of escape if he leaves official custody
without authorization.
(2) A prisoner is guilty of aggravated escape if in the
commission of an escape he uses a dangerous weapon, as
defined in Section 76-1-601, or causes serious bodily injury to
another.
(3) Aggravated escape is a first degree felony.
(4) Escape from a state prison is a second degree felony.
(5) Any other escape is a third degree felony.
(6) Any prison term imposed upon a prisoner for escape
under this section shall run consecutively with any other
sentence.
(7) For the purposes of this part:
(a) "Confinement" means:
(i) housed in a state prison or any other facility
pursuant to a contract with the Utah Department of
Corrections after being sentenced and committed and
the sentence has not been terminated or voided or the
prisoner is not on parole;
(ii) lawfully detained in a county jail prior to trial
or sentencing or housed in a county jail after sentencing and commitment and the sentence has not been
terminated or voided or the prisoner is not on parole;
or
(iii) lawfully detained following arrest.
(b) "Official custody" means arrest, whether with or
without warrant, or confinement in a state prison, jail,
institution for secure confinement of juvenile offenders, or
any confinement pursuant to an order of the court or
sentenced and committed and the sentence has not been
terminated or voided or the prisoner is not on parole. A
person is considered confined in the state prison if he:
(i) without authority fails to return to his place of
confinement from work release or home visit by the
time designated for return;
(ii) is in prehearing custody after arrest for parole
violation;
(iii) is being housed in a county jail, after felony
commitment, pursuant to a contract with the Department of Corrections; or
(iv) is being transported as a prisoner in the state
prison by correctional officers.
(c) "Prisoner" means any person who is in official custody and includes persons under trustee status.
1997
76-8-309.5. A b s c o n d i n g .
(1) An offender absconds from a facility when he:
(a) leaves the facility without permission; or
(b) fails to return at a prescribed time.
(2) An offender absconds from supervision when he willfully changes the residence that he reported as his correct
address without notifying his parole officer or obtaining permission.
(3) Absconding is a third degree felony.
(4) For the purposes of this section:
(a) "Facility" means a residential facility owned, operated, leased, or contracted by the Department of Correc-
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tions or a county to provide housmg, programming, or
treatment of individuals who have been placed on parole
(b) "Offender" means a person who has been convicted
of a crime and has been
d) sent to a facility,
(11) placed on parole under condition t h a t he report
to a parole officer on a regular basis or that he serve
periods of confinement during his parole period or
that he attend classes or treatment as a condition of
parole, or
(m) released for a period during confinement for
work, school, treatment, or other temporary
nonconfinement purposes
1997
76-8-310. A i d i n g e s c a p e — P e n a l t i e s .
( D A person is guilty of aiding escape if
(a) the person aids another person to escape from
official custody as defined in Section 76-8-309, or
(b) the person knowingly provides a person in official
custody with an item which may facilitate the escape of
such person, or
(c) being a person in official custody, the person knowingly procures, makes, or possesses an item which may
facilitate escape
(2) An offense under this section is a second degree felony if
(a) the actor is a public servant whose duty is to detain
persons arrested for offenses or convictions of crime who
knowingly facilitates, aids, or permits an escape from
official custody, or
(b) the person provides a dangerous weapon, as defined
in Section 76-1-601, to facilitate the escape, or
(c) the person causes serious bodily injury to another to
aid the escape
(3) Any other offense under this section is a third degree
felony
1997
76-8-311.

Repealed.

1990

76-8-311.1. S e c u r e areas — I t e m s p r o h i b i t e d — P e n alty.
(1) In addition to the definitions in Section 76-10-501, as
used in this section
(a) "Correctional facility" has the same meaning as
defined m Section 76-8-311 3
(b) "Explosive" has the same meaning as defined for
"explosive, chemical, or incendiary device" defined in
Section 76-10-306
(c) "Law enforcement facility" means a facility which is
owned, leased, or operated by a law enforcement agency
(d) "Mental health facility" has the same meaning as
defined m Section 62A-12-202
(e) (l) "Secure area" means any area into which certain
persons are restricted from transporting any firearm,
ammunition, dangerous weapon, or explosive
(11) A "secure area" may not include any area
normally accessible to the public
(2) A person in charge of a correctional, law enforcement, or
mental health facility may establish secure areas within the
facility and may prohibit or control by rule any firearm,
ammunition, dangerous weapon, or explosive
(3) At least one notice shall be prominently displayed at
each entrance to an area in which a firearm, ammunition,
dangerous weapon, or explosive is restricted
(4) Provisions shall be made to provide a secure weapons
storage area so that persons entering the secure area may
store their weapons prior to entering the secure area The
entity operating the facility shall be responsible for weapons
while they are stored in the- storage area
(5) It is a defense to any prosecution under this section t h a t
the accused, in committing the act made criminal by this
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section, acted in conformity with the facility's rule or pohcy
established pursuant to this section
(6) Any person who knowingly or intentionally transports
into a secure area of a facility any firearm, ammunition,
dangerous weapon or explosive is guilty of a third degree
felony
1996
76-8-311.3. I t e m s prohibited in c o r r e c t i o n a l a n d mental h e a l t h facilities — P e n a l t i e s .
(1) As used in this section
(a) "Contraband" means any item not specifically prohibited for possession by offenders under this section or
Title 58 Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act
(b) "Controlled substance" means any substance defined as a controlled substance under Title 58, Chapter 37,
Utah Controlled Substances Act
(c) "Correctional facility" means
d) any facility operated by the Department of
Corrections to house offenders in either a secure or
nonsecure setting
(n) any facility operated by a municipality or a
county to house or detain criminal offenders,
(m) any juvenile detention facility, and
dv) any building or grounds appurtenant to the
facility or lands granted to the state, municipality, or
county for use as a correctional facility
(d) "Medicine" means any prescription drug as defined
in Title 58, Chapter 17a, Pharmacy Practice Act but does
not include any controlled substances as defined in Title
58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act
(e) "Mental health facility" has the same meaning as
defined in Section 62A-12-202
(f) "Offender" means a person m custody at a correctional facility
(g) "Secure area" has the same meaning as provided m
Section 76-8-311 1
(2) Notwithstanding any other statute to the contrary,
including Subsection 76-10-50Kb), a correctional or mental
health facility may pro\ ide by rule t h a t no firearm, ammunition, dangerous weapon, implement of escape, explosive, controlled substance, spirituous or fermented liquor, medicine, or
poison in any quantity may be
(a) transported to or upon a correctional or mental
health facility,
(b) sold or given away at any correctional or mental
health facility,
(c) given to or used by any offender at a correctional or
mental health facility, or
(d) knowingly or intentionally possessed at a correcr
tional or mental health facility
(3) It is a defense to any prosecution under this section if
the accused in committing the act made criminal by this
section
(a) with respect to a correctional facility operated by
the Department of Corrections, acted in conformity with*
departmental rule or policy,
(b) with respect to a correctional facility operated by a
municipality, acted in conformity with the policy of the"
municipality,
^
(c) with respect to a correctional facility operated by a,
county, acted in conformity with the policy of the county;
or
\y
(d) with respect to a mental health facility, acted uiu
conformity with the policy of the mental health facility -,
(4) (a) Any person who transports to or upon a correctional^
facility, or into a secure area of a mental health facility,
any firearm, ammunition, dangerous weapon, explosive,^
or implement of escape with intent to provide or sell it to
any offender, is guilty of a second degree felony
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(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review
of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under
Subsection (e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record
holding a statute of the United States or this state
unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the
United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction
of a first degree or capital felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have
original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments,
or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has
original appellate jurisdiction, except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a
capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a)
through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or
denying a petition for writ of certiorari for the review of a
Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall
review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under
Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements
of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative
proceedings.
1996
78-2-3.

Repealed.

1986

78-2-4.

S u p r e m e Court — R u l e m a k i n g , j u d g e s pro tempore, a n d practice of law.
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and
evidence for use in the courts of the state and shall by rule
manage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend
the rules of procedure and evidence adopted by the Supreme
Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both nouses
of the Legislature.
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the U t a h Constitution,
the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and
judges and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties.
Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United States,
U t a h residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah.
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the practice of
law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and
discipline of persons admitted to the practice of law.
1986
78-2-5.

Repealed.

1988

78-2-6. Appellate court administrator.
The appellate court administrator shall appoint clerks and
support staff as necessary for the operation of the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals. The duties of the clerks and
support staff shall be established by the appellate court
administrator, and powers established by rule of the Supreme
Court.
1986
78-2-7.

Repealed.

1986

78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court.
The court may at any time require the attendance and
services of any sheriff in the state.
1988
78-2-8 to 78-2-14.

Repealed.

1986,1988
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CHAPTER 2a
COURT OF APPEALS

Section
78-2a-l.
78-2a-2.
78-2a-3.
78-2a-4.
78-2a-5.

Creation — Seal.
Number of judges — Terms — Functions —
Filing fees.
Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
Review of actions by Supreme Court.
Location of Court of Appeals.

78-2a-l. Creation — Seal.
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals is a court of record and shall have a seal.
1986

78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions —
Filing fees.
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term
of appointment to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is
until the first general election held more than three years
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the
term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed
and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of Appeals
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per a n n u m or
fraction thereof for the period served.
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in
panels of three judges. Assignment to panels shall be by
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a
chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc.
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from among the members of the court by majority
vote of all judges. The term of office of the presiding judge is
two years and until a successor is elected. A presiding judge of
the Court of Appeals may serve in t h a t office no more than two
successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity
of the presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of
presiding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of
Appeals. In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of
Appeals, the presiding judge shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of
Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court'
and the Judicial Council.
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for
the Supreme Court.
1988
78-2a-3. Court of A p p e a l s j u r i s d i c t i o n .
i
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all ex-:
traordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary:' v
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
,J
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
^
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, includ-^
ing jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
"Vi
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals fronH
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceed^
ings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commis^J
sion, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional <
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire J
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and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review.of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section
63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first
degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or
capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first
degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first
degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, visitation,
adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the
Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by
the vote of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme
Court for original appellate review and determination any
matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate
jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures
Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
1996
78-2a-4. R e v i e w of a c t i o n s by S u p r e m e Court.
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of
Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court.
1986
78-2a-5. L o c a t i o n of Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in Salt Lake
City. The Court of Appeals may perform any of its functions in
any location within the state.
1986
CHAPTER 3
DISTRICT COURTS
Section
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed.
78-3-3.
Term of judges — Vacancy.
78-3-4.
Jurisdiction — Appeals.
78-3-5.
Repealed.
78-3-6.
Terms — Minimum of once quarterly.
78-3-7 to 78-3-11. Repealed.
78-3-11.5.
State District Court Administrative System.
78-3-12.
Repealed.
78-3-12.5.
Costs of system.
78-3-13.
Repealed.
78-3-13.4.
Transfer of court operating responsibilities —
Facilities — Staff— Budget.
78-3-13.5, 78-3-14. Repealed.
78-3-14.2.
District court case management.
78-3-14.5.
Allocation of district court fees and forfeitures.

78-3-4

Section
78-3-15 to 78-3-17. Repealed.
78-3-17.5.
Application of savings accruing to counties.
78-3-18.
Judicial Administration Act — Short title.
78-3-19.
Purpose of act.
78-3-20.
Definitions.
78-3-21.
Judicial Council — Creation — Members —
Terms and election — Responsibilities —
Reports.
78-3-21.5.
Data bases for judicial boards.
78-3-22.
Presiding officer — Compensation — Duties.
78-3-23.
Administrator of the courts — Appointment —
Qualifications — Salary.
78-3-24.
Court administrator — Powers, duties, and
responsibilities.
78-3-25.
Assistants for administrator of the courts —
Appointment of trial court executives.
78-3-26.
Courts to provide information and statistical
data to administrator of the courts.
78-3-27.
Annual judicial conference.
78-3-28.
Repealed.
78-3-29.
Presiding judge —Associate presiding judge —
Election — Term — Compensation — Powers
— Duties.
78-3-30.
Duties of the clerk of the district court.
78-3-31.
Court commissioners — Qualifications — Appointment — Functions governed by rule.
78-3-1 to 78-3-2.

Repealed.

1971, 1981, 1988

78-3-3. Term of j u d g e s — Vacancy.
Judges of the district courts shall be appointed initially
until the first general election held more than three years
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the
term of office for judges of the district courts is six years, and
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed
and qualified.
1988

78-3-4. Jurisdiction — Appeals.
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters
civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and
not prohibited by law.
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary
writs and other writs necessary to carry into effect their
orders, judgments, and decrees.
(3) The district court has jurisdiction over matters of lawyer discipline consistent with the rules of the Supreme Court.
(4) The district court has jurisdiction over-all matters
properly filed in the circuit court prior to July 1, 1996.
(5) The district court has appellate jurisdiction to adjudicate trials de novo of the judgments of the justice court and of
the small claims department of the district court.
(6) Appeals from the final orders, judgments, and decrees of
the district court are under Sections 78-2-2 and 78-2a-3.
(7) The district court has jurisdiction to review agency
adjudicative proceedings as set forth in Title 63, Chapter 46b,
Administrative Procedures Act, and shall comply with the
requirements of that chapter, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
(8) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the district court has
subject matter jurisdiction in class B misdemeanors, class C
misdemeanors, infractions, and violations of ordinances only
if:
(a) there is no justice court with territorial jurisdiction;
(b) the m a t t e r was properly filed in the circuit court
prior to July 1, 1996;

